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THE DARK SIDE OF GRUTTER
Girardeau A. Spann*

I. INTRODUCTION

Liberals have generally cheered the Supreme Court's decision in Gruffer v. Bollinger1 as validating the continued use of affirmative action in the struggle against racial injustice. 2 But the
Supreme Court's modern race cases rest on a misunderstanding
of the nature of contemporary racial discrimination. From
Brown,3 to Bakke,4 to Grutter,5 the Court has advanced a color* Copyright© 2004 by Girardeau A. Spann. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Alex Alcinikoff, Diane Dimond, James Forman, Jr., Steven Goldberg, Emma Jordan, Patricia King, Robin Lenhardt, Gary Peller,
Mike Seidman, Palma Strand, Mark Tushnct, and participants in the Georgetown University Law Center Faculty Seminar program for their help in developing the ideas expressed in this article. Research for this article was supported by a grant from the
Georgetown University Law Center.
I. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327-30, 334 (holding that diversity is a compelling state
interest in an educational context, and upholding the Michigan law school affirmative
action program as a narrowly tailored effort to promote diversity). Proponents of affirmative action were generally pleased with the Court's decision in Grutter. See, e.g.,
Steven Lubct, Affirmative Action Battle Has Just Begun, BALT. SUN, June 25, 2003, at
15A ("Theodore M. Shaw, counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
likewise announced that the two opinions, taken together, constitute a strong endorsement of the constitutionality of affirmative action ... .");see also Monica Davey, Diversity Still Crucial Issue at University, Students Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A26
(" ... students declared the Supreme Court decisions a victory this afternoon."); Steven
Greenhouse & Jonathan D. Glatcr, Companies See Law School Ruling as a Way to Help
Keep the Diversity Pipeline Open, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A25 ("Businesses seeking to achieve diversity can breathe a sigh of relieP'); cf. Neil A. Lewis, Some on the Right
See a Challenge; Angry Groups Seeking a Justice Against Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24,2003, at A1 ("The Supreme Court rulings on the University of Michigan admissions policies set off a wave of consternation among conservative groups today.").
3. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954) (invalidating separate-butequal public schools); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (requiring
desegregation of public schools "with all deliberate speed").
4. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also id. at 287320 (opinion of Powell, J., stating that racial quotas were impermissible, but that race
could be used as a "plus" factor in educational admissions).
5. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322-24, 327-42 (2003) (upholding educational affirmative
action program giving holistic and individualized consideration to applicants); but cf
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 247-76 (2003) (invalidating educational affirmative ac-
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blind conception of racial equality that treats race-conscious affirmative action as constitutionally suspect, because it deviates
from an aspirational baseline of race neutrality that lies at the
core of the equal protection clause. However, race neutrality is a
hopelessly artificial concept in a Nation like ours, that continues
to make race an operative factor in the allocation of nearly all
significant societal resources. Rather, it is colorblind race neutrality that should be viewed as constitutionally suspect, because
that is what now constitutes the culture's preferred form of racial
discrimination. Contemporary "race neutrality" is simply a modern descendent of the more traditional forms of invidious discrimination that have been practiced in the United States since
the Nation was founded. And the Supreme Court's current preference for race-neutrality over race-consciousness is a modern
descendent of the Court's own tradition of complicity in racial
discrimination.
Part II of this article describes the Supreme Court's current
conception of racial discrimination, emphasizing the manner in
which the Court has confused the concept of race neutrality with
the concept of racial equality. Part III argues that the concept of
race neutrality is constitutionally suspect, because it has now become a tool for discriminating against racial minorities. Part IV
argues that the only way in which we are ever likely to remedy
the systemic discrimination that continues to permeate American culture is by pursuing the precise racial balance goals that
the Supreme Court has deemed to be unconstitutional. Part V
concludes that the Supreme Court is once again impeding the
Nation's progress toward racial equality, as it has done so many
times in the past.
II. THE COURT'S CONCEPTION OF EQUALITY
The Supreme Court views racial equality as if it were largely
synonymous with race neutrality. As a result, the Court treats all
racial classifications as constitutionally suspect, and subjects
them to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause,
whether they are invidious or benign. 6 The Court's preference
for prospective neutrality has the effect of invalidating most uses
of race-conscious affirmative action, which in turn makes it diffilion program awarding specified number of points lo minority applicants as loo mechanicallo be narrowly tailored).
6. See Grutter, 539 U.S. al 324-26; Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
223-27 (1995).
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cult to eliminate the existing inequalities that have been produced by centuries of prior discrimination. 7
A. RACE NEUTRALITY
The Supreme Court's fondness for race neutrality is traceable to Brown v. Board of Education. 8 Brown invalidated the
race-conscious, separate-but-equal regime of Plessy v. Ferguson,9
holding that, in our racially stratified society, separate was "inherently unequal." 10 Brown, therefore, treated race-conscious
governmental classifications as intrinsically objectionable, even
if race was used in ways that were hypothetically "equal." But
Brown also generated a logical dilemma. The Nation's long history of official discrimination left a legacy of existing inequalities
that could not be remedied merely through the use of prospective race neutrality. Indeed, the ingrained and often unconscious
racial attitudes that caused Brown to characterize racial segregation as inherently unequal meant that racial minorities could
never make up for the considerable head start that whites had
given themselves in the race for economic, political and social
resources-unless whites were forced to slow down long enough
for racial minorities to catch up. Therefore, the race-neutral society that Brown envisioned could come into existence only
through use of the race-conscious means that Brown found objectionable. Brown and its progeny ultimately sought to resolve
this dilemma by permitting the use of race-conscious measures
only where necessary to remedy past or present constitutional
violations. 11 However, Brown was unclear about precisely why
race consciousness offended the Constitution. 12

7. Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in Gratz contains statistics illustrating existing racial inequalities in the distribution of societal resources. See Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244,301-03 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
8. 347 U.S. 483,493-96 (1954) (invalidating separate-but-equal public schools).
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("Separate educational facilities arc inherently unequal.").
II. See Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (limiting scope of federal court remedial power to redress of constitutional violations); cf
North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1971) (invalidating prohibition on race-conscious pupil assignment designed to advance racial balance as inconsistent with remedial requirements of Brown).
12. Brown might have been motivated by a number of things, including the desire
to reduce racial stigmatization; the desire to equalize intangible factors in the educational
process; or the desire to protect associational rights. See generally GEOFFREY STONE ET
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 448-53 (4th cd. 2001).
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The Court's reason for treating race consciousness as constitutionally suspect was fleshed out by Justice Powell's opinion in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. 13 Bakke stressed
that the problem with racial classifications was that they stereotyped people as members of particular racial groups, rather than
treating people as individuals. 14 Moreover, because that was true
of all racial classifications-whether invidious or benign-all racial classification should be subject to strict scrutiny under the
equal protection clause. 15 Affirmative action programs could not
therefore use "racial quotas" to achieve "racial balance," because that would subordinate individual characteristics to group
membership in a way that violated the tenets of liberalism on
which the equal protection clause rested. 16 Once again, however,
the Court's understanding of racial discrimination simply reposed the Brown dilemma. Because someone's race is an important component of his or her individual identity, individualized
consideration must necessarily entail some degree of raceconscious consideration. Justice Powell sought to resolve the dilemma by permitting the use of race as a "plus" factor in what
was otherwise an individualized assessment of merit. But that
could only be done as part of a program that was narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest, thereby satisfying
the demands of strict scrutiny. 17 Although the Bakke "holding"
consisted largely of the views of Justice Powell, a five-Justice
majority of the Supreme Court endorsed those views in Grutter
v. Bollinger. 18
Grutter reaffirmed the conclusion that strict scrutiny applied
to benign as well as invidious racial classifications, 19 but for the
first time since its infamous decision in Korematsu v. United
States ,20 the Supreme Court u11,held a racial classification after
strict equal protection scrutiny. 1 The Grutter holding was largely
13. 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978) (Powell, J.).
14. /d. at 298-300, 315 (Powell, J.); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. 332-33; Richmond v.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469,493-94 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
15. Bakke relied on Brown in rejecting the claim that benign racial classifications
disadvantaging the white majority should be judged more permissively than invidious
classifications disadvantaging racial minorities. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 293-99 (opinion of
Poweli,J.).
16. /d. at 289,307, 315 (Powell, J.); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at329-30.
17. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-19 (opinion of Powell, J.).
18. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-29, 332-36.
19. See id. at 324-29.
20. 323 u.s. 214 (1944).
21. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344-45. This was also the first time that Justice
O'Connor had ever voted to uphold a racial affirmative action program. See
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACflON ACfON: TwENTY-FIVE
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unexpected, because several lower courts had invalidated similar
affirmative action programs,22 and because the Court's 1995 decision in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 23 made it look as if strict
scrutiny would be fatal for affirmative action. Although the Adarand Court expressly held open the possibility that some affirmative action programs might be adequate to survive strict scrutiny/4 the program at issue in Adarand itself was so mild, that
the Court's assurance appeared more rhetorical than real. 25 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Adarand also implied that
racial affirmative action would be constitutionally impermissible
if race-neutral alternatives had not first been proved inadequate,26 but her majority opinion in Grutter curiously held that
the Constitution did not require all race-neutral alternatives to
be exhausted. 27 Nevertheless, Grutter continued the Supreme
Court preference for race-neutral over race-conscious classifications, by subjecting only race-conscious classifications to strict
scrutiny. 28
Grutter reaffirmed the Bakke view that diversity could constitute a compelling state interest in an educational context/9 but
YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 159-63 (2000) (discussing Supreme Court voting blocs on issue of racial affirmative action).
22. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1033 (1996) (invalidating diversity-based affirmative action program for University of
Texas student admissions); see also Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234 (2001) (invalidating diversity-based affirmative action program for University of Georgia);
Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
529 U.S. 1019 (2000) (invalidating diversity-based affirmative action program for Montgomery County, Maryland magnet school); Tuttle v. Arlington County, 195 F.3d 698 (4th
Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1050 (2000) (invalidating diversity based affirmative
action program for Arlington, Virginia public schools); Wesmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790
(1st Cir. 1998) (invalidating diversity-based affirmative action program for Boston Latin
School); Taxman v. Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en
bane), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997), cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997) (invalidating diversity-based affirmative action program for New Jersey high school teacher layoffs); Podberesky v. Kirwin, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995)
(invalidating University of Maryland minority college scholarship program); but see
Smith v. University of Washington Law School, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001) (dismissing as moot prospective challenge to diversity-basedaffirmative action program for University of Washington Law School, and holding that
student diversity did constitute compelling state interest).
23. 515 u.s. 200 (1995).
24. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal scrutiny).
25. What the Court found constitutionally suspect was simply a rebuttable presumption that racial minorities were socially and economically disadvantagedsomething that would seem to be beyond dispute. See id. at 205-10 (describing presumption).
26. See id. at 237-38; see also Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989).
27. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-40.
28. See id. at 326.
29. See id. at 323, 328-30.
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it also strongly endorsed Bakke's distaste for racial quotas. In
upholding the racial affirmative action program used by the
University of Michigan law school, the Grutter Court went to
great pains to stress that the program was valid because it merely
used race as a "plus" factor in "a highly individualized, holistic
review of each applicant's file," 30 and did not entail the use of racial quotas that "would amount to outright racial balancing,
which is patently unconstitutional." 31 The Court hammered the
point home on the same day by invalidating, in Gratz v. Bollinger,32 the separate racial affirmative action program used by the
University of Michigan undergraduate college. It found that the
undergraduate program's automatic award of a fixed number of
points to minority applicants denied "individualized consideration" to each applicant, and had "the effect of making 'the
factor of race ... decisive' for virtually every minimally qualified
underrepresented minority applicant." 33 Although it is likely that
future affirmative action programs will now be structured to
emulate the program upheld in Grutter, the Court's insistence on
holistic consideration of admissions files may increase the administrative burden imposed on admissions offices enough toreduce the amount of affirmative action that schools can afford to
undertake.
The precedential value of Grutter is uncertain for at least
two reasons. First, the case may or may not be limited to the
educational context in which it was decided. Justice Scalia's contrary suggestion notwithstanding,34 diversity may not be recognized as compelling in other contexts such as employment,
where the goal is productivity rather than the exchange of intellectual ideas and perspectives. Second, because Justice
O'Connor has become the swing vote on the issue of affirmative
action, the precedential value of Grutter may be limited by both
30. /d. at 337.
31. !d. at 330. Like Justice Powell in Bakke, see 438 U.S. 265,316-19 (1978), Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter paid homage to the Harvard affirmative action
plan as a model of holistic, individualized consideration that did not make use of racial
quotas. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335-37. The deference shown to Harvard is ironic, in light
of Harvard's history of using quotas to limit the admission of Jews. See id. at 369 (Thomas, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (invalidating racial affirmative action program at University
of Michigan undergraduate College of Literature, Science and Arts).
33. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72, quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265,317 (1978) (Powell, J.) (ellipsis in original).
34. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that diversity justification endorsed by majority could be used to justify affirmative action in public and
private employment).
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her personal policy preferences and her tenure on the Court. If a
more conservative Justice were to replace Justice O'Connor,
Grutter might be narrowly interpreted or even overruled. If the
case were narrowly interpreted, Justice Kennedy's position in
Grutter might become controlling, and the law of affirmative action could once again revert to its post-Adarand status. Affirmative action would remain theoretically permissible, but in actuality, no program would likely be found to survive strict scrutiny. 35
However, it may also be true that considerations of efficiency
and collegiality will make the Court reluctant to revisit the racial
affirmative action issue in the immediate future. Despite political changes on the Court, it took 19 years for Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casei 6 to supplant Roe
v. Wade 37 with resRect to the issue of abortion, and 17 years for
Lawrence v. Texas 38 to overrule Bowers v. Hardwice 9 with respect to the issue of homosexual sodomy.40 Perhaps Grutter will
remain the law through inertia for a similar period of time.
Prior to Grutter and Gratz, the Supreme Court politics of affirmative action was fairly simple to ascertain. A five Justice
conservative bloc-consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas-virtually always voted against affirmative action. A four-Justice liberal
bloc-consisting of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer-virtually always voted in favor of affirmative action. 41
In the wake of Grutter and Gratz, things have become a bit more
complicated. Justice O'Connor voted with the liberal bloc to uphold the affirmative action plan in Grutter, 5-4,42 and Justices
O'Connor and Breyer voted with the conservative bloc to invalidate the affirmative action plan in Gratz, 6-3. 43 There now seem
to be seven votes to reject the proposition advanced by the Fifth
35. Like Justice O'Connor prior to Grutter, Justice Kennedy has never voted to uphold a racial affirmative action program. This is also true of Justices Scalia and Thomas,
and with one exception, of Chief Justice Rehnquist. See SPANN, supra note 21, at 159-63
(discussing Supreme Court voting blocs on issue of racial affirmative action).
36. 505 u.s. 833 (1992).
37. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
38. 539 u.s. 558 (2003).
39. 478 u.s. 186 (1986).
40. I owe this insight to a comment made by my colleague Professor Mark Tushnet
at a Georgetown University Law Center Supreme Court Institute program on Grutter
and Gratz in the summer of 2003.
41. See SPANN, supra note 21, at 159-63 (discussing Supreme Court voting blocs on
issue of racial affirmative action).
42. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310 (majority opinion of O'Connor, J.).
43. See Gratz, 539 U.S at 247, 276 (O'Connor, J., joining majority opinion and concurring); id. at 281-82 (Breyer, J ., concurring in the judgment).
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Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas, 44 that race can never be used in an
affirmative action plan, even to advance educational diversity.
Because only Justices Scalia and Thomas would now support
such an approach, 45 some form of racial affirmative action is
likely to remain at least theoretically constitutional.
The diversity reasoning of Grutter could also undermine
other lower court decisions. For example, Grutter might now authorize the use of minority scholarships, such as those invalidated by the Fourth Circuit in Podberesky v. Kirwin, 46 as a
means of getting minority students actually to attend the schools
that admitted them in the hope of increasing diversity. Similarly,
Grutter might now authorize the use of race-conscious teacher
layoffs, such as those invalidated in Taxman v. Piscataway
Township Board of Education, 47 as a means of promoting faculty
diversity in the exchange of ideas to which students are exposed.
Grutter might even authorize efforts to increase diversity in the
pool of doctors or lawyers available to serve minority communities, even though such an interest was expressly rejected as not
compelling by Justice Powell in Bakke.48 On the present Court, it

44. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1033 (1996) (" ... any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose
of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
45. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and stateprovided education is no exception."); id. at 350 (Thomas. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Similarly, a university may not maintain a high admission standard and
grant exemptions to favored races."); id. at 371 (" ... the majority still cannot commit to
the principle that racial classifications arc per se harmful and that almost no amount of
benefit in the eye of the beholder can justify such classifications.") (emphasis in original).
46. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995) (invalidating minority college student scholarship program). Note that Grutter's insistence on ensuring
that all students be able to compete for all scats may be read to preclude the usc of minority scholarships. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (a program cannot insulate one category
of applicants from competition with all other applicants).
47. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en bane), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997), cert.
dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997) (invalidating diversity-based affirmative action program
for high schoolteacher layoffs). Note that Justice O'Connor has previously voted against
race-conscious teacher layoffs, but she has declined to rule them out in all cases. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,293-94 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
48. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310-11 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J ., slating that any compelling interest in increasing health care to minority
communities can be advanced through race-neutral means). To the extent that the quality of professional services for a diverse population can be improved by increasing the
diversity of the professionals who provide those services, Grutter might make this interest
compelling. Cf Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that diversity
justification endorsed by majority could be used to justify affirmative action in public and
private employment).
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appears as if Justice O'Connor will have the decisive vote in determining how such policy issues will be resolved.
B. SOCIETAL DISCRIMINATION

Liberal celebrations notwithstanding, Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion in Grutter seems likely to prolong rather than
ameliorate the problem of racial discrimination. It holds that affirmative action programs must be narrowly tailored in order to
survive strict scrutiny,49 but it defines narrow tailoring to mean
non-responsiveness to the continuing problem of systemic discrimination. Consistent with Bakke's assertion that racial classifications are unconstitutional because they treat people as members of a group rather than as individuals, Grutter views racial
discrimination as something that is particularized rather than
pervasive in nature. 50 Accordingly, it reaffirms prior cases asserting that affirmative action cannot constitutionally be used to
remedy general "societal discrimination. " 51 This, in turn, allows
the Court to treat the concept of racial equality as if it were
largely synonymous with the concept of prospective race neutrality. As long as the continuing effects of prior discrimination can
be disregarded by denominating them "societal," formal equality
can be achieved merely by insisting on prospective colorblindness.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that the goal of
reducing systemic or "societal discrimination" is a constitutionally impermissible goal for race-conscious affirmative action.
The Court believes that the pursuit of such a goal would authorize affirmative action programs that were too vast, and too burdensome on innocent whites. 52 Moreover, it would permit the
state to utilize quotas to achieve racial balance in a way that was
inconsistent with the race-neutrality foundations of Brown.
Therefore, the Court has historically limited race-conscious affirmative action to narrowly tailored remedies for particularized
acts of past discrimination that were supported by reliable legis-

49. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-34 (requiring narrow tailoring, and upholding
Michigan law school affirmative action program as a narrowly tailored effort to promote
diversity).
50. See id. at 324, 326 (equal protection clause protects personal rights rather than
group rights).
51. See id. at 323-24, 328 (rejecting remedies for "societal discrimination" and
remedies designed to promote racial balance).
52. See id. at 323-24, citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310 (Powell, J.).
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lative, judicial or administrative findings. 53 Although Grutter has
now authorized the use of affirmative action to promote diversity, it has nevertheless reaffirmed the traditional prohibition on
usin~ affirmative action to remedy general societal discrimination. 4
By ruling race-conscious remedies for societal discrimination out of bounds, the Supreme Court has enabled itself largely
to sidestep the dilemma posed by Brown and Bakke. The
Court's reconceptualization of "racial equality" as something
that can exist despite the continued systemic effects of past discrimination avoids most needs to authorize the use of raceconscious remedies in the pursuit of equality. Prospective race
neutrality typically becomes adequate to satisfy whatever demands the equal protection clause imposes, because the inequalities that cannot be eliminated through race-neutral means
typically do not count for equal protection purposes. That sort of
reconceptualization is precisely what the Court used to deal with
the problem of Northern school desegregation in the post-Brown
era. Not wanting to force suburban white children to go to
school with inner-city black or Latino children, the Supreme
Court simply defined one-race minority schools to be "desegregated" despite the fact that their racially identifiable character
had not changed. 55 Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in
53. This position was articulated by Justice Powell in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10
(Powell, J.), and reasserted by Justice Powell in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 274-79 (1986) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.). Lead by Justice O'Connor, this view
has now been adopted by a majority of the full Supreme Court. See Gruuer, 539 U.S. at
323-24 (majority opinion of O'Connor, J., citing Bakke as rejecting interest in remedying
societal discrimination); id. at 330 (rejecting racial balancing as "patently unconstitutional"); see also Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 496-98 (plurality opinion of
O'Connor, J., rejecting societal discrimination); Metro Broad. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547,
610-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (rejecting societal discrimination); Wygant, 476 U.S. at
288 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (rejecting societal discrimination); Johnson v. Transp.
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647-53 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting societal discrimination).
54. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at323-24, 328.
55. Because of de facto residential segregation, inner-city school students arc often
predominantly minority while students in surrounding suburbs arc often predominantly
white. Meaningful desegregation of these schools would, therefore, require busing between inner-city and suburban schools. However, the Supreme Court held in Milliken v.
Bradley (l), 418 U.S. 717,737-47 (1974), that interdistrict busing was prohibited in the
absence of an interdistrict constitutional violation-something that did not typically exist
in the suburbs, where there were too few minority students to warrant segregation. Then,
in Milliken v. Bradley (ll), 433 U.S. 267, 279-88 (1977), the Court implied that the remedy for unconstitutionally segregated inner-city schools could consist of mere remedial
education programs. Finally, in Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991), the Court stated that a school district could become
"unitary," once the district "had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree"
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Gratz offers a striking statistical demonstration of the ways in
which societal discrimination continues to make racial minorities
an identifiable underclass in American culture. 56 But the Supreme Court has now chosen simply to define racial equality as
something that takes no cognizance of those inequalities. Grutter's recognition of a constitutionally legitimate interest in educational diversity may superficially seem to be an exception to this
characterization. 57 However, I believe that after more careful
scrutiny, Grutter is better understood as having little to do with
the interests of racial minorities.

III. RACE-NEUTRAL DISCRIMINATION
The Supreme Court's preference for race neutrality, rooted
in its reluctance to confront the continuing problem of systemic
societal discrimination, turns out to be a fairly effective way of
engaging in racial discrimination. By reading the Constitution to
preserve the racial status quo in the allocation of significant societal resources, the Nation's white majority is able to continue
discounting the interests of racial minorities in ways that are too
passive to be immediately recognized as oppressive. Even Grutter is discriminatory in this sense, because it authorizes only
marginal increases in racial diversity while prohibiting more
meaningful systemic change. Interestingly, Justice Thomas identifies and exposes this aspect of the majority opinion, but he remains unwilling to endorse systemic remedies himself.

and "the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable."
The Milliken and Dowell cases, therefore, allow previously segregated inner-city ("dual")
schools to become "desegregated" ("unitary") schools without any change in their racial
composition. They also effectively re-constitutionalized the separate-but-equal status of
public schools that Brown had formally declared unconstitutional. Because the Supreme
Court has never expressly stated that a school system can be both segregated and unitary,
it is possible to read the Milliken and Dowell cases as standing for the alternate proposition that racially segregated school systems remain dual because of their racially identifiable character, but that the Constitution simply docs not permit them ever to be made
unitary because of the constraints imposed by Milliken I. Whatever theoretical foundation such a reading might have, as a practical matter, it still permits the maintenance of
segregated schools.
56. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,299-304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
57. Indeed, it is not clear why promoting the educational diversity that Gruuer recognizes as a compelling governmental interest is not itself a remedy for the "societal discrimination" that Grutter finds to be beyond the reach of race-conscious affirmative action. To the extent that the lack of diversity in elite educational institutions is caused by
the societal discrimination embedded in admission standards, it is possible to read Gnater as retreating from the Court's previous ban on the use of race-conscious affirmative
action to remedy societal discrimination.
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A. PASSIVE OPPRESSION
The United States has a long tradition of invidious discrimination against racial minorities, and an equally long tradition of
insisting on both the de jure and the de facto relevance of race in
nearly all aspects of American life. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the culture's new-found affinity for prospective race neutrality in the post-Brown era comes at a time when racial minorities
have begun to make economic, political and social gains through
the use of race-conscious affirmative action. By arresting those
gains, current demands for race neutrality are simply the modern
incarnation of the same invidious discrimination that the culture
has used to oppress racial minorities in the past. It seems more
than a mere coincidence that contemporary voter initiative proposals requiring race neutrality, and even prohibiting the collection of statistical data in racial categories, have been sponsored
by political conservatives (who have historically opposed racial
minority rights) rather than by rolitical liberals (who have historically favored minority rights). 58
Similarly, the Supreme Court's refusal to allow even majoritarian political remedies for societal discrimination, fits comfortably within a long tradition of Supreme Court impediments
to the advancement of racial equality. It is reminiscent of earlier
Supreme Court decisions urholding the appropriation of Indian
lands, 59 upholding slavery, 6 upholding official segregation, 61 upholding the exclusion of Japanese-American citizens from their

58. Ballot initiatives prohibiting government consideration of race in educational
admissions, hiring and contracting have been enacted in California (Proposition 209) and
Washington (Initiative 200). Governor Jeb Bush of Florida has issued an executive order
prohibiting the consideration of race in state university admissions. See Erik Lords, Taking Sides, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 27, 2003, at 26. A proposed initiative
(Proposition 54) in California that would have prohibited the collection of most demographic data by race, was defeated in the October 7, 2003 recall election in which Arnold
Schwarzenegger replaced Gray Davis as Governor of California. See Rebecca Trounson
& Nancy Vogel, Total Recall: Propositions 53 and 54; Both Ballot Measures Go Down in
Defeat, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at A26. These proposals have been sponsored or supported by Ward Conncrly, the black conservative regent of the University of California
who spearheaded the adoption of California Proposition 209. See id.; Katherine Corcoran, Support Narrows For Racial Initiative; Interest Grows Among Latinos, Field Poll
Finds, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 19,2003, at 13.
59. See Johnson v. Mcintosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (European discovery of
land now constituting United States, and conquest of indigenous Indian inhabitants, divested Indians of title to that land).
60. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (invalidating congressional statute prohibiting slavery in Louisiana Territory).
61. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding separate-but-equal racial
segregation).
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homes, 62 and upholding de facto racial segregation. 63 Viewed
against this backdrop, the Supreme Court's insistence on defining narrow tailoring to preclude remedies for societal discrimination is more than just curious. 64 The Court's position is itself constitutionally suspect, because it seems to be motivated by
a desire to ensure that racial minorities continue to occupy their
traditional social status as subordinate to whites. Despite the
lofty rhetoric that is typically used to advocate it, there is nothing
noble about contemporary race neutrality.
The thing that animates the Supreme Court's conception of
racial discrimination is a belief that it should be understood as a
particularized phenomenon that is unrelated to the statistically
disproportionate hardships suffered by racial minorities as a
group. However, the most oppressive forms of contemporary
discrimination are systemic in nature. They are revealed by racially-correlated statistical disparities, and not by pairing individual discriminators with individual victims. The reason that racial minorities occupy a perpetual underclass in the United
States is that they are statistically underrepresented in the allocation of societal resources. 65 And that remains true even though
the Supreme Court finds it difficult to identify a particularized
cause of that pervasive underrepresentation. 66
The serious conceptual difficulty encountered in trying to
distinguish between particularized discrimination and societal
discrimination is illustrated by the Supreme Court's recent foray
into race-conscious redistricting. The Court has held that the
"predominant" consideration of race in drawing voting district
lines offends the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because it violates the individual rights of voters who are placed in

62. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding World War II
military exclusion order directed at Japanese-American citizens).
63. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189, 208-09 (1973) (adopting expansive interpretation of de jure segregation, but reaffirming prohibition on usc of race-conscious
remedies to eliminate de facto segregation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1971) (same); cf, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,238-48 (1976) (reading equal protection clause to permit racially disparate impact not directly caused by intentional discrimination).
64. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-24, 328,334 (2003) (rejecting societal
discrimination and use of racial quotas to achieve racial balance).
65. Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in Gratz contains statistics illustrating existing racial inequalities in the distribution of societal resources. See Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244, 301-03 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
66. See, e.g., Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,498-508 (1989) (despite stark statistical disparities, record was insufficient to reveal any past racial discrimination in Richmond, Virginia construction trades).
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particular districts because of their race. 67 But as Justice Ginsburg has pointed out, redistricting is an activity that is almost always based on the statistical presence of various groups in various districts. Redistricting has no bearing whatsoever on
individual rights. 68 In that sense, societal discrimination is like
redistricting. It is solely about the statistical representation of
various groups in the allocation of resources. It has nothing
whatsoever to do with the individual rights that the Supreme
Court claims to be protecting as it perpetuates societal discrimination.69
Here is a way to appreciate the racial discrimination that is
entailed in the Supreme Court's refusal to allow remedies for societal discrimination. It seems reasonably clear that most whites
would not want to trade places with blacks. Indeed, one study
found that white college students would want $1 million per year
in damages if they were suddenly to be made black rather than
white. 70 The reason for this is presumably because of the nonparticularized societal discrimination that continues to exist
against blacks in American culture. The Supreme Court not only
refuses to recognize such discrimination as something for which
the Constitution provides a remedy, but it actually reads the
equal protection clause as prohibiting affirmative action remedies for such discrimination. However, the Court does read the
Constitution to prohibit discrimination against whites who are
burdened by affirmative action programs. And it does so even
though any discrimination against whites is equally nonparticularized.
It is just as hard to tell which individual white is harmed by
affirmative action as it is to tell which individual black is harmed
by the societal discrimination that gives rise to the need for af67. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916-17 (1995) (articulating "predominant
factor" test).
68. See id. at 946-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, arguing that redistricting has no bearing on individual rights).
69. This lies at the core of a longstanding debate concerning individual and group
rights under the equal protection clauses. Compare Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of
the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 48-52 (1976) (arguing that discrimination, and consequently discrimination remedies, should be viewed as individual
phenomena) and Michael J. Perry, The Principle of Equal Protection, 32 HASTINGS L.J.
1133, 1145-48 (1981) (same), with Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 147-77 (1976) (arguing that discrimination, and consequently discrimination remedies, should be viewed as group phenomena).
70. See ANDREW HACKER, TwO NATIONS 32 (1992) (describing study); see also
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1759 (1993) (discussing
study described by Hacker).
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firmative action. The abolition of affirmative action might increase the number of whites admitted to a particular program,
but no particular white can know whether he or she would have
been the one admitted. Many whites with similar credentials will
inevitably be competing for the few additional slots that are
freed up by the abolition of affirmative action, and some of those
whites will inevitably be displaced by the better qualified blacks
who are no longer admitted to more prestigious programs because of the demise of affirmative action. 71 Similarly, the abolition of general societal discrimination might increase the number
of blacks admitted to a particular program, but no particular
black can know whether he or she would have been the one admitted. Because of the many imponderables involved, counterfactual futures simply cannot be predicted with the degree of
precision that would be required to turn systemic racial discrimination into particularized racial discrimination. That is true
whether the systemic discrimination is caused by affirmative action or by general societal discrimination.
However, even if one insists on ignoring systemic discrimination and characterizing unconstitutional racial discrimination
as the violation of an individual right-as the Supreme Court insists on doing 72 - that characterization is equally applicable to
both affirmative action and societal discrimination. To the extent
that the burdens of affirmative action can be personified by the
harm to one individual white who might have been admitted to a
program in the absence of affirmative action, the burdens of societal discrimination can be personified by the harm to one individual black who might have been admitted to a program in the
absence of societal discrimination. The only difference is the
race of the groups (or individuals) that the Supreme Court decides to protect or abandon. If the victims are white, the Supreme Court will protect them by invalidating the offending affirmative action program. But if the victims are black, the
71. Where there arc both a large number of applicants for a limited number of
spaces and a large number of white applicants relative to the number of minority applicants, affirmative action will significantly increase the probability that particular minority
applicants will be admitted to a program. However, the abolition of affirmative action
will not significantly increase the probability that particular white applicants will be admitted to the program. See Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic
Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1045-50 (2002). Perhaps this
is the ultimate point of Justice Stevens' objection to the plaintiffs' standing to challenge
the affirmative action program at issue in Gratz. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 266,
283-88 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324, 326 (2003) (equal protection clause
protects personal rights rather than group rights).
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Supreme Court will abandon them and disregard the offending
societal discrimination. As it has done so often in the past, the
Supreme Court is simply favoring the interests of whites over the
interests of racial minorities. In a culture replete with invidious
societal discrimination against racial minorities, the Supreme
Court has focused its attention on the more marginal burdens
that affirmative action imposes on whites. That is called racial
discrimination.
B. JUSTICE THOMAS

Justice Thomas recognizes that the Grutter majority is ignoring the systemic nature of contemporary discrimination, and
is providing only incidental benefits to racial minorities. In fact,
his Grutter dissent contains the seeds of a fairly radical theory of
social change. But his curious commitment to a race-neutral conception of equality ultimately causes him to favor the denial of
all race-conscious remedies over the provision of remedies that
are more comprehensive.
Justice Thomas calls Grutter's concern with diversity merely
"aesthetic," because it makes the student bodies at elite institutions look more colorful, without measurably improving the social circumstances of underprivileged minorities. 73 In arguing
that this aesthetic concern does not amount to a compelling state
interest, Thomas claims that the Court's real interest is in protecting elitism. If elitism were not a concern, a school could increase its diversity in race-neutral ways simply by modifying its
admissions standards to accept all qualified students; by abandoning practices that disproportionately disadvantage minorities,
such as legacy preferences; or by discontinuing the use of racially
skewed standardized tests, such as the LSAT. 74 Thomas also
suggests that racial minority interests are being sacrificed in order to promote diversity at elite institutions, arguing that blacks
learn better in historically black schools; that affirmative action
beneficiaries do not learn as much as students who are admitted
without preferences; and that minority beneficiaries are stigmatized by affirmative action. 75
Justice Thomas recognizes that the underrepresentation of
racial minorities in the allocation of societal resources is the
product of established cultural practices that collectively consti73.
74.
75.

See id. at 354-55 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 355-61,367-71.
See id. at 364-66,371-74.
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tute societal discrimination. He also recognizes that minority interests are commonly sacrificed in order to preserve that societal
discrimination. Moreover, his elitism argument gains increased
plausibility when one recalls that the Court was willing to uphold
an affirmative action plan for the Michigan law school in Grutter,
but was not willing to uphold a similar plan for construction
workers in Adarand. 76
The radical feature of Justice Thomas's position is his stated
willingness to abandon the cultural practices that perpetuate the
continued existence of societal discrimination. For him, that
would be a race-neutral way of solving the problem of systemic
discrimination. The problem with that solution, however, is that
the society at large is almost certainly unwilling to abandon
those cultural practices. The practices are so deeply ingrained
that they seem inevitable rather than optional. Although we
have known about the discriminatory implications of traditional
admissions standards, legacies, and LSAT scores for decades, we
remain noticeably reluctant to abandon them. However, for
some reason, we are willing to carve out occasional affirmative
action exceptions to those cultural practices for racial minorities.
But Justice Thomas would invalidate all such exceptions on the
grounds that they are race conscious, even though he would endorse the more radical step of abandoning those cultural practices completely.
Justice Thomas's commitment to race neutrality seems logically to be rooted in either the belief that the status quo is race
neutral; the belief that prospective race neutrality will eventually
eliminate any racial inequities that exist in the current allocation
of resources; or the belief that existing inequities are preferable
to the negative consequences of affirmative action. However,
none of those positions is tenable.
Far from being race neutral, the status quo has been racially
skewed by a long history of discrimination. This is illustrated by
the continued existence of the very cultural practices that Justice
Thomas himself identifies as discriminatory.
The notion that prospective neutrality could eventually enable racial minorities to overcome the disadvantages imposed by
76. See Ada rand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Note, however, that this
argument can also cut the other way. To the extent that the Supreme Court is motivated
by the desire to protect whites who are harmed by affirmative action, the Court was more
willing to protect the less-elite white construction workers in Adarand than the moreelite white law school applicants in Cruller.
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a history of discrimination seems extremely counterintuitive.
Minorities could overcome the enormous head start that has
been given to whites only if minorities were more qualified than
whites to satisfy the standards built into those cultural practices-standards that favor whites over minorities. And no one
seems to believe that racial minorities are more qualified than
whites.
The argument that affirmative action will ultimately harm
racial minorities by stigmatizing them and ~roducing other collateral harms has more facial plausibility. 7 Empirical studies
suggest that even when the benefits of affirmative action outweigh the attendant harms, the harms themselves remain significant.78 And I argue in the present article that the limited affirmative action authorized by Grutter is likely to have only marginal
benefits for racial minorities. 79 Nevertheless, the argument that
racial affirmative action is unconstitutional because it harms its
intended beneficiaries is not an argument that I am able to take
seriously. It seems reasonably clear that the benefits of real affirmative action-affirmative action that successfully addressed
the problem of existing "societal discrimination" -would greatly
outweigh any increase in the stigmatization harms that racial minorities are already forced to endure. One is better off having resources than being thought well of while continuing to languish
in a perpetual underclass. But even if it were a closer question,
an institution with the racial history of the Supreme Court 80
lacks the moral authority to tell racial minorities what is in their
own best interest. If Justice Thomas's anxieties about affirmative
action were shared by racial minorities in general, those anxieties would merit more careful consideration. However, when
they echo the views of the very white majority whose privileged
status would be reduced by affirmative action, those anxieties
seem as disingenuous as they do paternalistic. One cannot help
but recall that slavery used to be defended by its white supporters on the grounds that the institution of slavery was good for

77. See supra text accompanying note 75 (Justice Thomas asserting that affirmative
action has negative consequences for racial minorities).
78. See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 12, at 593-94 (discussing empirical research,
including Linda Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations after Affirmative
Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251 (1998)).
79. See supra introductory paragraph for Part III.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 59·64 (discussing cases in which Supreme
Court has promoted racial inequality).
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blacks, because it elevated blacks from their natural savage
state. 81
If Justice Thomas comes to recognize his conception of race
neutrality as unrealistic, he may be willing to endorse more
meaningful race-conscious remedies. As some commentators
have suggested, Justice Thomas may simply be acting out a
deep-seated psychological resentment of liberals who never took
his accomplishments seriously, by opposing the very affirmative
action programs from which he himself benefited. 82 But he
seems not yet to have realized that it is also possible to punish
liberals from the left, and not only from the right.
IV. RACE-CONSCIOUS EQUALITY
Only vigorous efforts to redistribute societal resources in
ways that are unapologetically race-conscious are likely to make
any qualitative change in the systemic discrimination that continues to characterize American culture. But Grutter's treatment
of such racial-balance remedies as inconsistent with a liberal
conception of individual rights consigns the concept of affirmative action to a role of marginal utility. Moreover, the lack
of any meaningful distinction between the Court's decisions in
Grutter and Gratz makes the Court's racial jurisprudence seem
both arbitrary and capricious. And it may be invidious as well.
A. RESOURCE REDISTRIBUTION

In a culture that was free from racial discrimination, one
would expect to see resources distributed in ways that were racially proportional. The maldistribution of resources that exists
in contemporary American culture is, therefore, evidence of continuing racial discrimination-either active discrimination, or
more passive acquiescence in the lingering effects of past discrimination. Logically, such discrimination must exist either in
the selection of the criteria that we use to govern resource allocation; in the manner in which we apply those criteria; or in the
81. See ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE
CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 217 (1974); LEON F.
LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 188-89 (1979);
see also Alfred L. Brophy, Some Concepwal and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AMER. L. 497, 521-22 (2003) (discussing argument advanced
in DAVID HOROWITZ, UNCIVIL WARS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER REPARATIONS FOR
SLAVERY (2002) that blacks were made better off by institution of slavery).
82. See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Could Thomas be Right,? N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2003,
at A25.
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training that we provide to satisfy those criteria. This syllogistic
conclusion can be avoided only if one believes that racial minorities are inherently inferior to whites in their ability to satisfy our
allocation criteria. And that, of course, would be simply another
form of racial discrimination.
If we were serious about racial equality, we would want to
redistribute societal resources in ways that promoted racial balance. And we would be willing to use racially proportional
guidelines and quotas to achieve that racial balance. Race conscious efforts to promote racial balance would enable us to approximate the distribution of resources that would exist in a
nondiscriminatory culture, which is something that we have not
otherwise been able to achieve. And treating racial balance as an
explicit goal would constitute an unambiguous statement of our
societal goals and priorities, which would be refreshing in its
candor. 83 Racial balance would also constitute a legal standard
that was easier for policymakers to implement than the current
affirmative action standards, which require policymakers to
guess about the Supreme Court's likely response to particular
uses of race. In fact, I suspect that most organizations wishing to
promote diversity and avoid unconscious racial discrimination
have in the past, and would in the future, find racial balancing to
be a useful prophylactic technique. But most important, racial
balance is likely to offer the only effective protection against the
various versions of societal discrimination that are embedded in
our more traditional resource allocation criteria. Such societal
discrimination is too ingrained, subtle and pervasive to be confronted directly, but is automatically counteracted by the racially
proportional allocation of resources.
Rather than facilitating the redistribution of societal resources in a way that would promote racial balance, the Supreme
Court has actually held such redistribution to be unlawful. As
has been noted, 84 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Gruffer
states that such a goal "would amount to outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional. " 85 But it is very difficult
to see why that should be so. The Court states that it is motivated by a desire to ensure that race-conscious remedies are not
too broad, and are not too burdensome on whites. 86 But that is
83. Cf Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, noting
the benefits of candor in the pursuit of diversity).
84. See supra text accompanying note 31.
85. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
86. See id. at 323-24, citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310 (Powell, J.).
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nonresponsive. The whole point of racial balance is to stop giving whites the resources that they have in the past secured
through societal discrimination, rather than through more legitimate means. The argument that racial balance is bad because
it would burden whites simply entrenches the problem.
A more serious justification for the Court's aversion to racial balancing is that the consideration of race is inconsistent
with the right that people possess in a liberal culture to be
treated as individuals rather than as members of a racial group. 87
But that argument is ultimately self-consuming. If allocating resources based on race is a denial of individual rights, then refusing to reallocate resources after they have initially been allocated by race is also a denial of individual rights. Once a culture
embarks along the path of race-conscious resource allocationas American culture did with a vengeance- it creates a zero-sum
relationship between affirmative action and discrimination that
cannot be eliminated until racial balance is restored. Whenever
we allocate a resource, we are either allocating it to whites in a
way that reinforces societal discrimination, or to racial minorities
in a way that ameliorates societal discrimination. There is no
middle ground, because there is no such thing as a race-neutral
allocation. There is only the pretense of race neutrality that occurs when we elect to use inertia as our preferred form of racial
discrimination. Which, of course, is precisely what the Supreme
Court has done by reading the Constitution to prohibit the raceconscious pursuit of racial balance. 88
Despite the Supreme Court principle of treating people as
individuals rather than as members of a racial group, it should be
noted that Grutter does not prohibit the consideration of race in
the allocation of societal resources. Grutter holds that race can
be considered, as long as it is treated as a "plus" factor in a "holistic" evaluation of individual attributes, and is not treated mechanically as a racial quota. 89 In this regard, the Court's ap87. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16 (discussing Justice Powell's concern in
Bakke that individuals not be treated as mere stereotypical members of various racial
groups). The Supreme Court has gone out of its way to stress that the equal protection
clause gives rise to individual rather than group rights. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326, citing
Adarand Constructors v. Pcna, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995).
88. Race neutrality is also unrealistic in contemporary American culture. Race is a
characteristic that is simply too salient and too pervasive to be ignored. Try to think
about things like welfare reform, law-and-order, D.C. statehood, the war in Iraq, or the
sexual assault charges filed against Kobe Bryant without thinking about race. Race
should technically have nothing to do with any of those topics, but it realistically has a lot
to do with them all.
89. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at328, 333-36.
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proach to race in Grutter is similar to its approach in Miller v.
Johnson, 90 where the Court held that race could be considered as
a factor in the redistricting context as long as it was not the
"predominant" factor. 91 In both instances, the Supreme Court
has adopted a position that is truly curious. It has rejected the
polar extremes of prohibiting all consideration of race, or of allowing the express pursuit of racial balance. Instead, it has in effect adopted the position that race can be considered as long as
five members of the Court do not think that race has been given
too much weight. 92 It is striking that the Justices would conclude
that the Supreme Court was institutionally more competent than
the policymaking arms of American culture to decide on appropriate uses of race, given the Court's historical record on the issue.93 Moreover, the Court's efforts to distinguish between permissible and impermissible uses of race do not seem to be
particularly coherent.
B. GRUTTER V. GRATZ
The Supreme Court purports to distinguish between constitutionally permissible and constitutionally impermissible uses of
race in its contrasting Grutter and Gratz opinions. Grutter upholds the race-conscious affirmative action program used by the
University of Michigan law school. 94 It holds that the consideration of race satisfies strict scrutiny if it is used to advance the
state's compelling interest in promoting student diversity in an
educational context, and is narrowly tailored in a way that treats

90. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
91. See id. at 916-17 (articulating "predominant factor" test); see also supra text accompanying notes 67-69 (discussing difficulties in viewing race-conscious redistricting as
violating any individual equal protection right).
92. This is similar to what the Supreme Court did for a time in obscenity cases,
when the Court regulated potentially obscene materials by majority vote because it was
unable to agree on a definition of obscenity. See, e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767,
769-71(1967) (per curiam). The Court's focus on racial balancing, avoiding quotas and
ensuring individualized consideration, focuses attention on distracting details and diverts
attention from the issue of whether the culture favors racial equality or continued societal discrimination. In this regard, the Court is engaged in classic Kelman-csquc legitimation. The Court's predominant regulatory agenda is implemented beneath the radar, because the culture's attention is focused on the details rather than the thrust of the Court's
actions. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 269-95 (1987) (describing cognitive model of legitimation); see also GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE
AGAINST THE COURT 151-59 (describing Supreme Court legitimation techniques in racial context).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64 (describing historical Supreme Court
decisions that were hostile to the interests of racial minorities).
94. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343-44.
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race as only one of many factors in an individualized consideration of each applicant's relative merits. 95 It is this "holistic" use
of race as a "plus" factor rather than as an inflexible percentage
"quota" that ensures that race is not being used in a way that
"makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of
his or her application." 96 Moreover, this individualized consideration, as part of a program that has "a logical end point," ensures that the use of race does not impose an undue burden on
innocent whites. 97
Gratz invalidates the race-conscious affirmative action program used by the University of Michigan undergraduate college.98 It reaffirms that diversit¥ can be a compelling state interest in an educational context,9 but holds that the use of raceconscious affirmative action does not satisfy the narrow tailoring
requirement for strict scrutiny if it results in the award of a fixed
number of points to each minority applicant. 100 Such a mechanical award of points is inconsistent with the individualized consideration required by the equal protection clause because it
"has the effect of making 'the factor of race ... decisive' for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant."101 Under the facts of Gratz, the award of points was likely
to be dispositive because the undergraduate program awarded
20 points to racial minorities (out of the 100 necessary to secure
admission), even though it would award only 5 points to an applicant whose "'extraordinary artistic talent' rivaled that of
Monet or Picasso." 102
Although the affirmative action programs at issue in Grutter
and Gratz met different constitutional fates, the two programs
are analytically indistinguishable. As columnist Michael Kinsley
has pointed out, for any individual applicant, race is either dispo95. See id. at 333-44.
96. See id. at 335-37.
97. See id. at 342-43. The "logical end point" for the Michigan law school program
appears to have been provided by Justice O'Connor's belief that such programs will no
longer be necessary 25 years from now. See id. at 343. fn fact, Justice Thomas actually
concurred in "the Court's holding that racial discrimination in higher education admissions will be illegal in 25 years." See id. at 351 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). ff this is indeed part of the Court's "holding," it suggests that the constitutionality of an affirmative action plan can be saved through the Court's imposition of an
informal sunset provision.
98. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003).
99. See id. at 247.
100. See id. at 269.
101. See id. at 271, quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317
(1978) (Powell, J.) (ellipsis in original).
102. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273, quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324 (Powell, J.).
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sitive or it is not. This is true no matter how many factors go into
an admissions decision. And it is true whether race is used holistically in connection with a flexible admissions process, or mechanically in connection with a mathematical score. 103 Therefore,
the differences that exist between the ways in which race was
used in Grutter and in Gratz are simply irrelevant to any constitutionally protected individual right. If it is constitutionally permissible for race to determine the fate of an applicant, that applicant's fate is not changed by the details of the program that
gave rise to the consideration of race. 104
The manner in which race is used can, of course, change the
statistical effect that race will have on an overall admissions
process, as well as the probability that members of a given race
will be admitted to a particular school. An affirmative action
program in which race is permitted to play a large role can result
in the admission of more minorities than a program in which
race is permitted to play only a small role. Assuming for the sake
of argument that the Grutter and Gratz programs do differ in the
number of applicants for which they will permit race to be dispositive, that difference still cannot be constitutionally significant. Because the Supreme Court insists that the egual protection clause protects individuals rather than groups, 105 the statistical impact of an affirmative action program on particular racial
groups is beside the point. The fact that an affirmative action
plan produced an increase in the number of minority students is
no more relevant than the fact that the Court's invalidation of
that plan would produce an identical increase in the number of
white students. Both statistics might be relevant to a concept of
racially-correlated group rights, but neither is relevant to the
concept of individual rights that the Supreme Court deems to be
controlling.

103. See Michael Kinsley, Want Diversity? Think Fuzzy, WASH. POST, June 25,2003,
at A23. To the extent that a "holistic" admissions process might seem intuitively different
from a more mechanical process, that intuition is likely to be nothing more than a function of the size of the applicant pool. It is possible to compare a small number of applicants without using mechanical sorting devices such as the numerical scores utilized in
Gratz, but it is difficult to see how a large number of applicants can be compared without
using some sort of scoring system. See infra, text accompanying note 114.
104. It is worth noting that seven Justices voted in ways that treated Cruller and
Gratz as indistinguishable. Only Justices O'Connor and Breyer saw constitutionally significant differences between the two cases. Compare Gratz, 539 U.S. at 247 (listing votes
of Justices) with Gruuer, 539 U.S. at 310 (listing votes of Justices).
105. See Gruuer, 539 U.S. at 324, 326 (equal protection clause protects personal
rights rather than group rights).
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One might be tempted to argue that the statistical impact of
racial affirmative action on an overall admissions process can be
translated into a violation of an individual right, because it reduces the probability that any particular white applicant will be
admitted to the program at issue. In order for that argument to
prevail, however, the Constitution would have to guarantee individuals some particular probability of admission, either in absolute terms or relative to other races. The Constitution does not,
of course, guarantee individuals any probability of admission in
absolute terms, and if it were read as guaranteeing a probability
of admission relative to other races, the Constitution would require precisely the racial balance that Grutter finds to be "pat..
1"106
ent l y unconstltutiOna
.
On a less abstract level, it is likely that the Grutter and
Gratz affirmative action programs are very similar in actual operation. Grutter holds that the Michigan law school program is
sufficiently individualized to satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny. 107 Justice Rehnquist, however, argues convincingly that the program is really about racial bclance.108 The stated justification for the law school program was
to enroll a "critical mass" of minority students sufficient to promote a meaningful exchange of ideas among students, and to ensure that minority students did not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race. But in reality, the law school ended up
admitting percentages of minority students that closely corresponded to the percentages of minority students in the law
school applicant pool. A majority of the underprivileged minority students were black; half that number were Latino; and onesixth of the number were indigenous Indians. Justice Rehnquist
notes that if the true goal of the program were to ensure the admission of a critical mass, there would not be such a large, racially proportional variation among the number of minority students admitted. He also emphasizes that the tiny number of
Indian students admitted could not meaningfully be considered a
critical mass. 109 Justice Kennedy also asserts that the law school's
increased use near the end of the admissions season of daily reports showing the racial breakdown of admitted students sug-

l 06. See id. at 330.
I 07. See id. at 333-44.
108. See id. at 379-85 (Rchnquist, J., dissenting).
109. See id; see also id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
arguing that law school program was really designed to achieve racial balance); id. at 38890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (same).
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gests that the law school was pursuing racial balance in a fairly
automatic manner. 110 Therefore, the manner in which the law
school treats race in the program that the Grutter Court upholds,
ultimately seems as mechanical as the manner in which the undergraduate coHeRe treats race in the program that the Gratz
Court invalidates. 1
Similarly, Gratz holds that the Michigan undergraduate
program is too mechanical in its consideration of race to satisfy
the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny. Justice
Souter, however, points out that the undergraduate affirmative
action prof:ram is actually more individualized than the majority
concedes.' 2 Unlike the program struck down in Bakke, every
applicant gets to compete for every seat under the Michigan undergraduate program. Moreover, race is only one of a number of
factors that are taken into account in the pursuit of diversity, and
the number of points awarded to racial minorities is the same as
the number of points awarded for other diversity factors such as
outstanding athletic ability. In addition, the undergraduate program gives admissions officers the discretion to "flag" applications for more individualized attention when they believe that
numerical scores alone do not adequately capture important
characteristics. Justice Souter also notes that the undergraduate
program provides for more individualized consideration of applicants than the fixed percentage plans the Solicitor General favored as a race-neutral alternative. 113 Law professors probably
find it easy to understand why the Michigan undergraduate program assigned a numerical value to the factor of race. It is similar to the manner in which professors commonly assign numerical values to particular arguments in grading exams. Those
professors would certainly claim that they were giving individualized consideration to each exam, but the use of numerical
scores greatly facilitates that individualized consideration. 114
Therefore, the manner in which the undergraduate program ultimately treats race seems as individualized as the way in which
\\0. See id. at 390-94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Note, however, that Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion appears to dispute the accuracy of Justice Kennedy's assertion. See id. at 336.
Ill. See Grarz Y. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 267-77 (2003) (invalidating undergraduate
affirmative action program).
112. See id. at 291-92 (Souter, J., dissenting).
113. See id.
114. To the extent that Grarz stands for the proposition that automatic numerical
values cannot be used in the process of evaluating a large pool of applicants for admission, it is like telling a professor that he or she must undertake the Herculean task of
grading 10,000 exams without using points.
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race is actually treated under the law school program that the
Court upheld in Grutter.' 15
The real difference between the law school program upheld
in Grutter and the undergraduate program invalidated in Gratz
seems to be that the Supreme Court believes that the Gratz program gave too much weight to the factor of race, and it did so in
a manner that was too transparent. That is what the Monet-andPicasso example seems to illustrate in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Gratz, 116 and that is what seems to bother Justice
O'Connor in her Gratz concurrence. 117 I suspect that in actual
operation, both programs would end up admitting largely the
same individual minority students, and would therefore have the
same general effect on white applicants. But even if I am wrong
about this, it is unlikely that differences in the weight given to
the factor of race within the range of these two programs could
rise to a level of constitutional significance.
There is a real irony in the emphasis that both cases place
on the use of points and numerical goals, with Grutter findin~
that such a use of numbers did not play an impermissible role, 11
and Gratz finding that it did. 119 The thing that the Court finds
troubling about numbers is their potential to serve as quotas that
insulate minority apglicants from competition in order to promote racial balance. 20 But that concern seems backwards. Assuming that minorities are not inherently inferior to whites, we
would expect a nondiscriminatory "holistic" admissions program, that was designed to promote diversity, to end up with a
racially proportional allocation of seats. However, if a program
attempts to use numerical methods to facilitate that goal (as in
Gratz), the program is unconstitutional because of its resemblance to a quota. Therefore, in order for a program to be constitutionally acceptable (as in Grutter), it will have to take great
pains to ensure that its consideration of diversity factors does not
produce results that make it look like quotas were used. The
only way to do this reliably is by taking conscious precautions to
ensure that the numerical percentages of minority admissions
\IS.
gram).
116.

See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-44 (upholding law school affirmative action pro-

See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273; see also supra, text accompanying note 102.
See id. at 279-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring, noting high number of points
awarded to racial minorities relative to number of points awarded for some other divcrsi t y factors).
118. See Cruller, 539 U.S. at 335-36.
119. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 269-74.
120. See Cruller, 539 U.S. 335-36.
117.
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vary from year to year, and do not correspond too closely to the
percentages of various racial groups in the applicant pool or in
the general population. Thus, the use of a "floating" racial quota
will be necessary to ensure that the program looks like a valid
holistic program, rather than an invalid quota program that was
intended to promote racial balance. 121 Since the institution will
have to pay a lot of attention to numbers either way, it is a bit
perverse to say that a program is valid only if it gives more consideration to numbers in order to create the impression that it
gave less consideration to numbers. In this regard, the Gratz
program is probably more honest than the Grutter programwhich is what makes it unconstitutional. 122 A Supreme Court
rule that produces such a result cannot be a proper rule of constitutional law unless our goal is to promote disingenuousness,
which, as Justice Thomas suggests, may well be the case. 123
There is no constitutionally significant difference between
the Grutter and Gratz programs. Gratz is simply more honest
than Grutter, which demands an unfortunate charade. The degree to which numbers are used mechanically as opposed to

121. There may even be an incentive to reject highly qualified minorities-especially
those who arc likely to end up actually attending more prestigious schools-in order to
show that a school is using highly individualized admissions standards rather than quotas.
That allows a school to demonstrate that it has admitted white students with lower scores
than some of the minority students who were rejected. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338 (focusing on acceptance of white applicants with lower scores than rejected minority applicants as evidence of individualized consideration).
122. This irony was not lost on Justice Ginsburg. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, noting benefits of candor in Michigan undergraduate affirmative action program).
123. Cf Grutter, 539 U.S. at 371-72 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part, arguing that law school program seeks only "facade" of class that "looks right").
Justice O'Connor's aversion to the usc of numbers in Gratz, 539 U.S. at 277-80, is
ironically inconsistent with the Justice O'Connor's own usc of numbers in Grutter, suggesting that 25 more years of affirmative action will be enough. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at
343. Presumably, Justice O'Connor chose that 25 year number because 25 years is the
amount of time that had elapsed between the 1978 decision in Bakke and the 2003 decision in Grutter. That is a pretty "mechanical" and "mathematical" manner in which to
decide how long affirmative action will continue to be constitutionally permissible. Why
not instead permit affirmative action to be used for another 350 years, as an approximation of the time that elapsed between the introduction of slavery in the Colonies and the
time of the Cruller decision? It also seems unrealistic to think that continuing societal
discrimination will permit the United States to achieve any meaningful level of racial
equality in next 25 years, after having failed to do so for centuries. Moreover, Justice
O'Connor's endorsement of a time-period test, rather than some sort of functional test,
for the continued validity of affirmative action is in tension with her rejection of a mechanical trimester test in favor of a more functional "undue burden" test to define the
scope of the constitutionally protected right to abortion. See Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-79 (1992) Uoint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ.).
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flexibly in the pursuit of racial diversity, hardly seems to be a
matter of constitutional significance. And the argument that we
should hide our conscious consideration of race in order to convey the impression that race is a less salient characteristic in contemporary culture than it really is seems counterproductive. The
whole point should be to highlight our race consciousness so that
we can no longer complacently pretend that we live in a raceneutral culture. Grutter and Gratz allow the continued use of
race-conscious affirmative action, but only with the understanding that it will not be used in ways that make any systemic
modifications in the current allocation of resources. The opinions take great pains to ensure that the continuing effects of societal discrimination will remain beyond the reach of raceconscious remedies. And that, in turn, perpetuates the invidious
discrimination against racial minorities that has always characterized American culture. The Supreme Court is unwilling to
concede that American culture is structurally discriminatory. But
the recognition of continuing structural discrimination seems
like the most important thing that is at stake in the affirmative
action debate. In a sense, Grutter and Gratz may present the
worst of both worlds for racial minorities. They leave open the
possibility that affirmative action will sometimes be constitutionally permissible, thereby preventing racial minorities from
becoming too unruly. But under the prevailing standards, truly
beneficial affirmative action programs will rarely be upheld in
reality. That is not a bad strategy for continued racial oppression.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent affirmative action decisions in
Grutter and Gratz reaffirm the limited availability of raceconscious affirmative action to make modest adjustments in the
allocation of societal resources. However, they also reaffirm the
Court's explicit prohibition on the use of affirmative action to
redress the pervasive "societal discrimination" that continues to
harm racial minorities. The pursuit of racial balance in the allocation of societal resources offers the only realistic hope of ever
solving the problem of systemic racial discrimination in the
United States. But that is precisely the remedy that the Supreme
Court has chosen to view as constitutionally impermissible. As a
result, the Court is now able to use the concept of prospective
race neutrality as a means of freezing existing racial inequalities
in the distribution of resources. And it is able to do so while pur-
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porting to advance the abstract goal of racial equality. Because
the Supreme Court has a long history of sacrificing racial minority rights for the advancement of white majority interests, it is at
least curious that we would continue to endorse a model of judicial review that permitted the Supreme Court to formulate racial
policy for the Nation. It is as if our commitment to the principle
of racial equality were as disingenuous now as it has been
throughout so much of our history.

